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THE FEDERAL ANALOGY AND STATE
APPORTIONMENT STANDARDS
Robert B. McKay*
Baker v. Carr' appears at first impression to be a prime example in the
American judicial tradition of deciding no more than is absolutely essential
for disposition of the immediate case. It purported to decide only questions
of jurisdiction, justiciability, and standing to sue2 where a claim was made
that state legislative apportionment in Tennessee arbitrarily impaired voting
rights. But only the wilfully blind could fail to see an invitation, if not a command, to a reordering of state legislative apportionment laws and practices.
Indeed, Mr. Justice Brennan, in a footnote to his opinion for the Court, almost
gave the whole show away when he referred to "our holding that the complaint
states a federal constitutional claim of violation of the Equal Protection Clause."'
Justice Douglas, in his separate concurring opinion, stated flatly that "if the
allegations in the complaint can be sustained a case for relief is established." 4
And Mr. Justice Clark was ready to decide the case on the merits. Because he
found "that Tennessee's apportionment is a crazy quilt without rational basis, 5
he concluded that "the Tennessee apportionment statute offends the Equal
Protection Clause. . ".."6
Although the majority more conservatively remanded
the case to the three-judge district court where it had originated, the reaction
in that court demonstrated that the Supreme Court opinions were read to
foreclose continuance of the existing apportionment. By the time the case came
back to the district court for reconsideration in light of Baker, the defendants
had conceded the invalidity of the existing laws and the Tennessee legislature
had enacted a new apportionment formula, which the three-judge court also
* B.S., LL.B.; Professor of Law, New York University; Member, District of Columbia,
Kansas, and United States Supreme Court Bars.
1 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2 So Mr. justice Brennan said for the Court. Id. at 197-98. Mr. justice Stewart stated
that the Court decided these "three things and no more." Id. at 265 (concurring opinion).
3 Id. at 195 n.15. Perhaps he used the word "claim" in the sense of "allegation," rather
than in the word-of-art sense of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

4 Id. at 245.

5 Id. at 254 (concurring opinion).
6 Id. at 258.
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promptly invalidated.' The subsequent band wagon rush to adjudicate equal
protection claims under other state apportionment provisions has been little
short of phenomenal. Within the first year after the decision in Baker more
than 50 cases were filed, and nearly that many decided, arising in at least 34
states.8
What the majority of the Supreme Court did not do in Baker, and wisely
refrained from attempting, was to make even a tentative judgment as to what
might be found to be appropriate standards required by the equal protection
clause in apportionment cases. There are good reasons for the Court's reluctance
to offer guidance at this early stage in the development of new constitutional
doctrine.
It is the ordinary way of judicial wisdom to approach new definitions of
constitutional dimension on a case-by-case basis as experience and facts developed
through actual case records demonstrate the problem and suggest solutions.
That cautious approach is of course especially appropriate here where the
courts, state as well as federal, deal with the very composition of state legislatures, their sometime rivals for power. Indeed, the question is so delicate that
until Baker many competent observers believed that the entire problem was
outside the range of judicial competence because the issues were political rather
than judicial. Although that somewhat mystical belief in legislative invulnerability to judicial scrutiny has now been clearly swept aside, it does not necessarily follow that the remaining questions as to the fixing of equal protection
standards and the approving of remedial formulas are less than difficult. Moreover, as a result of past judicial reluctance to decide cases involving this aspect
of the right of franchise, there is no significant body of Supreme Court jurisprudence to define what is meant by the right of franchise, which is clearly
central to the now-crucial question as to what dilution of the vote, if any,
might be permissible. It is true that in earlier cases the Court has dealt
with impairment of the right to cast ballots.' ° And of course these cases have
some precedential value in this connection;" but the issue in the apportionment cases is also sufficiently different from that in the honest-vote-count cases
that genuinely new analysis is necessary in developing an adequate set of
principles.
Thus, it seems apparent that the Supreme Court is approaching gradually
the task of defining the right of franchise. And if Baker may be regarded as the
7 Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
8 For a summary of the cases through the end of 1962, see McKay, Political Thickets
and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MicH. L. REv. 645, 706-10
(1963).
9 For an illuminating discussion, see McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case,
76 HARv. L. REV. 54 (1962).
10 See United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); Swafford v. Templeton, 185
U.S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
11 In Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963), Mr. Justice Douglas cited the cases
in general support of this proposition: "The idea that every voter is equal to every other
voter in his State, when he casts his ballot in favor of one of several competing candidates,
underlies many of our decisions." But cf. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, id. at 386.
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setting of the stage, Gray v. Sanders2 may be thought of as the dress rehearsal,
while the main drama is yet to be played out.
Sanders was not strictly an apportionment case, as the majority and concurring opinions spelled out with almost overanxious meticulousness, 3 yet the
central issue was not unrelated to the issues raised in apportionment cases. The
case involved an alleged impairment of the vote in a situation never before
passed upon by the federal courts; the dispute was between a claimed right
to equal representation for all similarly situated voters against a contention
-that rural voters could be favored over urban voters as a matter of legislative
preference. Thus, appellants contended with remarkable candor that the county
unit system at issue was designed "to achieve a reasonable balance as between
urban and rural electoral power.""'
That the Supreme Court should select Sanders for its first decision after
Baker is itself an interesting example of docket control and orderly progression
in the development of a constitutional principle. Baker was a good "first case"
because, once the preliminary issues were disposed of to permit adjudication
of the equal protection issue, the merits were relatively simple. The voter discriminations that had developed out of the Tennessee legislature's failure to
reapportion were manifest, whether viewed vertically or horizontally or, presumably, even if the viewer stood on his head. For similar reasons Sanders was
a good "second case" because, if ever the equal protection clause was to be
applied in a meaningful way, the voter discrimination there demonstrated
cried out for correction. Again, as in Baker, the risk of getting off to a premature
or otherwise faulty start was minimal. The Court could say, as it did, that
the decision was made without prejudice to later cases waiting in the wings
for their entrance cues, all involving the fixing of appropriate equal protection
standards for application to the more difficult apportionment cases." Despite
this elaborate disavowal of prejudgment, however, there is no mistaking the
fact that Sanders is highly relevant to at least some of the issues yet to be decided.
The most important questions on which the Supreme Court must yet give
guidance relate to (1) a definition of equal protection standards to be applied
in the area of apportionment, and (2) an elaboration of what judicial remedies
12 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
13 "This case, unlike Baker v. Carr, supra, does not involve a question of the degree to
which the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth -Amendment limits the authority of a
State Legislature in designing the geographical districts from which representatives are chosen
either for the State Legislature or for the Federal House of Representatives." Id. at 376
(Douglas, J.). "Nor does the question here have anything to do with the composition of
the state or federal legislature. And we intimate no opinion on the constitutional phases of
that problem beyond what we said in Baker v. Carr, supra!' Id. at 378 (Douglas J.). "This
case does not involve the validity of a State's apportionment of geographic constituencies
from which representatives to the State's legislative assembly are chosen, nor any of the
problems under the Equal Protection Clause which such litigation would present." Id. at
381-82 (Stewart, J., concurring).
14 Id. at 370.
15 On June 10, 1963, the Supreme Court noted jurisdiction, for argument in the October
1963 Term, of six cases raising equal protection questions in the context of state legislative
apportionment and districting, 374 U.S. 802 (1963): WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp.
368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (No. 460); Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes,
229 Md. 406, 182 A.2d 877, 184 A.2d 715 (1962) (No. 554); Mann v. Davis, 213 F.
Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962) (No. 797); Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962),
juris. noted sub nom. Reynolds v. Sims (No. 508); Vann v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D.
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are available for the correction of apportionments that are found deficient when
measured against the standards fixed by the Court. The balance of this paper
will be devoted to an examination of the first of those two questions, the matter
of defining appropriate standards,16 particularly in connection with the argument frequently advanced against judicial intervention based upon the socalled federal analogy. At its simplest, the contention is that to the extent that
the federal electoral process in various respects results in impairment or dilution
of the vote, similar practices in the states should be approved on the basis of
that model. The examples principally relied upon are the federal electoral college, the choice of senators without regard to population, and the partially nonrepresentative character even of the manner of selecting members of the House
of Representatives.
Broadly speaking, the issue may be stated in terms of the popular and
That concept, which will here be
appealing phrase, "one man-one vote."'
called the equal-population principle, may be applied in connection with several
different aspects of the state political process, possibly raising different issues
at the various levels, as will be noted below.
The division of political power within each state is a matter for state
determination. The United States Constitution has always been understood
to be silent on the question of the extent to which, and the manner in which,
state governmental powers are separated and distributed." Yet in every state
the principal governmental powers are divided in some fashion between the
governor as chief executive and the legislature, while the judiciary serves to
some extent as a restraint upon both. Since in every state the governor and
the legislators are elected, the equal-population principle could be held to affect
the election of the governor and the choice of legislators in each house."
Attention should thus be directed first to the question whether in state-wide
Ala. 1962) (No. 540); McConnell v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962) (No. 610).
The latter three (Alabama) cases, probable jurisdiction having been noted, were consolidated
for argument.
The Supreme Court also noted jurisdiction of two cases challenging congressional districting, 374 (U.S.-1963); Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962), juris.
noted sub nom. Wesberry v. Sanders (No. 507); Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. 460
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) (No. 950).
The Oklahoma apportionment case was dismissed because not appealable under 28
U.S.C. § 1253 (1958), 374 U.S. 103 (1963): Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla.
1962), appeal filed sub nom. Price v. Moss, Oklahoma Farm Bureau v. Moss (Nos. 688 & 699).
16 The development of an appropriate meaning for equal protection in the apportionment
context has not yet been carefully explored in many court opinions. But commentators apart
from the courts have begun the inquiry. See e.g., THE POLITICS OF REAPPORTIONMENT
(Jewell ed. 1962); the following symposia: The Electoral Process: Part II, 27 L. & CONTEMP.
PROS. No. 3 (1962); The Problem of Malapportionment: A Symposium on Baker v. Carr,
72 YALE L.J. 1 (1962); articles: Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative Government: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REv. 711 (1963); McKay, Political
Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. REV., 645
(1963); a good student note: Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apportionments: A Problem of
Standards, 72 YALE L.J. 968 (1963). And of course the other articles in this symposium
also deal with the question of standards. See also note 17 infra.
17 See the pamphlet by that name, containing a statement of basic principles of legislative
apportionment as agreed upon at a 1962 conference of research scholars and political scientists held by the Twentieth Century Fund. The statement was prepared for publication by
Anthony Lewis of the New York Times.
18 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S.
71, 84 (1902).
19 Except in Nebraska which has a unicameral legislature.
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election contests (including primary elections) any deviation is permissible from
the standard of full voter equality. To this question, which was directly involved
in Sanders, the Court gave the simple and direct answer that faithful adherence
to the equal-population principle is required. The relevance of that holding is
discussed more fully below.
A second question is then logically directed to a determination of the
requirements to be imposed upon the selection of legislators in both houses of
the state legislatures. With rare exceptions, state legislators are chosen from
single-member districts fixed by state law along geographical lines dictated by
considerations of area or the integrity of political units or both. To some extent
the two houses may be given different powers and responsibilities; but more
typically their functions differ principally in the fact that the legislators in the
two houses represent different constituencies and usually serve different terms.
Thus, both houses not only contribute jointly and indispensably to the political
processes of state government, but as well serve as checks and restraints upon
each other. The significance of this dual function in the apportionment context
goes to the question whether the equal-population principle should be applied
strictly in both houses of the state legislature or only in one.
The principal question which has been raised in this connection is whether
the federal analogy is relevant to the state legislative process. That is, since
in Congress members of the House of Representatives are chosen in reasonably
close relation to population, while members of the Senate are selected without
regard to population, is a similar plan permissible in state legislatures? Reasons
will be suggested below for rejecting the analogy. But first it should be helpful
to examine more carefully the facts and holdings in the Georgia county unit
case, Gray v. Sanders.
Under Georgia law each county was given a specified number of representatives in the lower house of the general assembly. The county unit system,
an issue in Sanders, applied as follows in state-wide primaries: A candidate for
nomination who received the highest number of popular votes in a county
was considered to have carried the county and to be entitled to two votes foe'
each representative to which the county was entitled in the lower house of.
the general assembly. The majority of the county unit vote was required to
nominate a United States senator or state governor, while a plurality was sufficient for nomination to other offices. Because the most populous county (Fulton
with a population in 1960 of 556,326) had only six unit votes, while the least
populous county (Echols with a population in 1960 of 1,876) had two unit
votes, "one resident in Echols County had an influence in the nomination of
candidates equivalent to 99 residents of Fulton County."2 The three-judge
district court before which the case was heard invalidated the county unit plan
above described, and as amended by the state legislature on the same day as
the hearing in the district court. 2' But the district court did not hold that all
20

Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 371 (1963).

21 The amendment modified the mathematics of the county unit system, but did not
change its essential features of weighted representation and allocation of all county unit votes
in each county to the front-running candidate. For an explanation of the amendment, see

372 U.S. at 372.
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weighted voting was outlawed. Rather the court sought to define the permissible
deviations from equal representation that might be approved as not invidiously
discriminatory. The district court would have permitted deviations from equality
comparable to the distortions of the popular vote that may occur in the federal
electoral college. 2
The Supreme Court, however, would have none of this. It disavowed
the analogy to the electoral college and rejected the district court's view that
some weighting is permissible. The reasons given are instructive. Analogies
to the electoral college (along with other claimed analogies to districting and
representation in state and federal legislatures) were found "inapposite":
The inclusion of the electoral college in the Constitution as the
result of specific historical concerns, validated the collegiate principle despite its inherent numerical inequality, but implied nothing about the use of an analogous system by a State in a statewide election. No such specific accommodation of the latter was
ever undertaken,3 and therefore no validation of its numerical inequality ensued.
While conceding that states "can within limits specify the qualifications of
voters both in state and federal elections," the Court denied that a state is
entitled to weight the votes "once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated ..
."" Accordingly, the Court concluded:
"The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence,
to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments can mean only one thing -one
person, one vote."25 It is clear,
then, that the fatal defect in the Georgia plan lay in the fact that votes were
weighted on the basis of geography in recognition of a legislative preference
for rural over urban voters2
The significance of the holding can best be appraised by viewing it from
several perspectives, each of which deserves analysis.
(1) What lesson may be learned from examination of the alternative
rulings which the Court necessarily considered and rejected? It is not without
interest that the opinion of the Court did not even mention the several earlier
per curiam opinions in which the Court had refused repeated invitations to
22

[A] unit system for use in a party primary is invidiously discriminatory
if any unit has less than its share to the nearest whole number proportionate
to population, or to the whole of the vote in a recent party gubernatorial
primary, or to the vote for electors of the party in the most recent presidential election; provided no discrimination is deemed to be invidious under
such system if the disparity against any county is not in excess of the
disparity that exists against any state in the most recent electoral college
allocation, or under the equal proportions formula for representation of
the several states in the Congress, and provided it is adjusted to accord
with changes in the basis at least once each ten years. Sanders v. Gray,
203 F. Supp. 158, 170 (N.D. Ga. 1962).

23 372 U.S. at 378. (Footnote omitted.)
24 Id. at 379.

25 Id. at 381. See also the concurring opinion of Justices Stewart and Clark: "Within
a given constituency, there can be room for but a single constitutional rule-one voter, one
vote." Id. at 382.
26 Mr. Justice Douglas noted that the Georgia plan "weights the rural vote more
heavily than the urban vote and weights some small rural counties heavier than other larger

rural counties." Id. at 379.
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upset the Georgia county unit system of conducting primary elections.2" While
it is true that none of these cases had been decided on the merits,2" the refusal
of decision had led many to believe that the system was not vulnerable to
constitutional attack. While Baker v. Carr necessarily dispelled the illusion
of unassailability, it did not necessarily point in the direction of invalidation
of any weighting whatsoever. Indeed, the district court, while entirely persuaded
that the existing system must fail, nonetheless was able to find that a less
discriminatory plan might be rational, and reasonable in its impact.2 "Rational"
the county unit system unquestionably was, at least in the sense of standing
for an objective that was perfectly understandable: The "city" vote should
not be allowed to control the choice of candidates for statewide office. But the
demands of the equal protection clause are not satisfied by a plan that is rational
only with respect to an improper legislative purpose. The system was an expression of confidence in the integrity of rural voters, the very voters who, under
the Georgia legislative apportionment, were empowered until 1962 to select
absolute majorities in both houses of the state legislature2 If the equal protection clause forbids any favoritism of rural over urban voters in statewide
elections, as Sanders unquestionably held, it does not seem a very long step to
conclude that any other electoral system which inescapably favors rural dominance in both houses of a state legislature is also suspect.
(2) What is the significance of the Court's rejection of the analogy sought
to be drawn to the practice in the federal electoral college? The United States
Constitution commands departure from the equal-population principle in the
federal election process in three respects:
(a) The most extreme is the provision for choice of two senators from
each state without regard to population, with the result that each senator from
Alaska represents fewer than 120,000 constituents, while each senator frone
California represents more than 8,000,000. The resulting differential is thus
more than sixty-five to one in terms of the relative influence of each voter. The
fact that authority for this inequality of representation is found in the Constitution
itself provides such justification as there is, in terms of that analogy to federal
practice, for similar differentials within state legislatures. The matter is further
discussed below.
(b) A much less extreme departure from the equal-population principle,
as authorized by the Federal Constitution, inheres in the fact that each state
is entitled to one representative in the House regardless of state population.
Thus, in the House Alaska is again overrepresented, with one representative
for its 1960 population of 226,167"' as compared with the 1960 apportion27

Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952);

South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Turman v.
Duckworth, ibid.
28 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 234-37 (1962).

29 Cf. Professor Dixon's contrasting of "reasonableness" with "rationality," with respect

to an apportionment plan, in Apportionment Standards and Judicial Power, 38 NOTRE DAME
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See Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), holding the legislative
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ment ratio of 410,000 used as the basic figure for computing the apportionment
of representatives to the States." Here the differential is more than two to
one as compared with states that are somewhat underrepresented." Disparities
of this nature occur similarly in state legislatures where district lines are drawn
in accordance with political lines; but the disparities in state legislatures thus
occasioned are often vastly greater than those in the United States House of
Representatives. 4
(c) In addition to the two constitutionally authorized deviations just
described is a third that falls somewhere between the first two in severity of
impact, because it is in part compounded of features of both. Section 1 of
article II of the Constitution provides for the designation in each state of "a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives
to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . ." who thereafter cast
votes for the President and Vice-President."
This last is the federal practice from which defendants in Sanders sought
support for the county unit system as to statewide primary elections. Supplementing the specific provisions in the Constitution, there developed over the
years the now almost invariable practice of all electors in each state being
guided in their votes by the popular vote in their respective states. The combined effect of the constitutional provision and that practice has intensified the
deviation from the equal-population principle, thus permitting the election of
a President and Vice-President who do not secure the largest number of
popular votes. One distortion arises out of the adding together of the number
of representatives to which the state is entitled in both houses of Congress, thus
cumulating the overrepresentation in each house enjoyed by some states. Taking
Alaska once more as an example, the state is entitled to three electoral votes
while New York (the most populous state at the time of the 1960 census) is
entitled to 43 electoral votes, a difference of less than fifteen to one, despite a
population differential substantially in excess of 100 to one. The other distortion
arises out of the fact that, by custom at least, all electors in each state almost
without fail cast their ballots in favor of the plurality winner in the state, thus
leaving unrecorded any fraction of voters who voted for any other candidate
in that state.
It is apparent that both these features of the federal electoral college were
incorporated into the Georgia county unit system. In view of that federal
precedent, however objectionable one may find the system, it is difficult to
state that it is utterly devoid of rationality or reason. Accordingly, it becomes
doubly significant that the Court should so readily reject the analogy as "inapposite." In a footnote explaining the nonrelevance today of the historical
32 Id. at 366.
33 E.g., Maine and New Mexico. In 1960 each had a population of nearly 1,000,000,
but was allotted only two representatives. Thus each representative in those states has between
two and three times as many constituents as does Alaska's single representative.
34 The greater differential is occasioned by the fact that the differences in population
between the largest and smallest counties in some states are vastly greater than the population
differential between the largest and the smallest state.
35 The original procedure was somewhat revised by the specifics of the twelfth amendment.
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motivations that prompted the adoption of the federal electoral system, Mr.
Justice Douglas stated: "Passage of the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments shows that this conception of political equality belongs to a bygone
day, and should not be considered in determining what the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires in state-wide elections.""6 The
relevance of this remark to other analogies drawn from federal constitutional
provisions is inescapable.
(3) How, if at all, does the holding in Sanders bear upon the equalpopulation principle of "one man, one vote"? 7 The most obvious point to be
made is that the detractors from the concept of one man, one vote can find no
comfort in the opinion; the emphatic holding is that equality of voter influence is required once the geographical unit of representation has been
designated. At the very least this means that all members of the state executive
branch who are elected on a statewide basis (as well as any state legislators
or congressmen chosen at large) must be selected without impairment of vote
based on geography, taxes paid, economic factors, or any other group interest.
The important result is that the equal-population principle won a clear and
apparently easy victory that at least frees the executive branch from domination by any minority interest group. The next question is to determine the extent
to which this concept should now be carried forward as a matter of logic to
one or both houses of the state legislatures. Although that problem was not
before the Court, and there was accordingly no precise ruling on the question,
the language comes very close to being language of decision on this matter as
well: "We think the analogies to the electoral college, to districting and redistricting, and to other phases of the problems of representation in state or
federal legislatures or conventions are inapposite." 3
It is accordingly very
difficult to read this language to mean anything other than that in the state
legislative context the Supreme Court denies the relevance of any analogy that
has so far been drawn from practices established by the United States Constitution for the conduct of federal elections.
Mr. Justice Douglas' reasons for rejecting the analogy derived from the
federal electoral college apply with equal force - and for additional reasons
as well -to the analogy sought to be derived from the fact that United States
Senators are chosen without regard to population. The analogy should be

36 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 377 n.8 (1963).
37 Variations in phrasing are interesting, but probably not important. Mr. Justice
Douglas spoke of "one person, one vote" (372 U.S. at 381), while Mr. Justice Stewart
referred to "one voter, one vote" (id. at 382). In Sincock v. Duffy, 215 F. Supp. 169, 175-76
(D. Del. 1963), the court took judicial notice of the nearly equal proportion of voters to
residents in the various election districts in Delaware, and stated that the same was generally
true of the other states of the Union.
38 372 U.S. at 378. Mr. Justice Douglas, in a footnote to this passage, observed that
the Court did not reach "the questions that would be presented were the convention system
used for nominating candidates in lieu of the primary system." Ibid., n.10. Where political
decisions are made by a convention, the considerations are of course somewhat different
because the basis for representation is differently conceived. Whatever equal protection
problems are posed by the use of conventions for the selection of primary candidates -and
there may be some-need not be decided in order to pass upon the validity of what purports
to be a direct election system, as varied by the county unit method of counting votes.
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rejected for reasons of history, constitutional command, and the logic that undergirds the American system of government.
If it be conceded, as now appears to be the consensus, 9 that at least one
house of a state legislature should be apportioned as nearly as possible on a
strict population basis,4" the question arises as to whether population must be
the exclusive, or at least the principal, factor in fixing the apportionment formula
in the other house. For some the question has seemed easy in terms of an appeal
to the constitutionally commanded apportionment practice in the federal Senate
and House. Thus, for Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Baker, the matter was
clear: "It is surely beyond argument that those who have the responsibility for
devising a system of representation may permissibly consider that factors other
than bare numbers should be taken into account. The existence of the United
41
States Senate is proof enough of that.1
In Baker the Court neither accepted nor rejected the Harlan insistence on
the federal analogy, for it was not relevant to the narrow issues decided by
the Court's majority. But in Sanders, where the claimed analogy to the federal
electoral college was relevant to the issue there presented, the Court, as already
noted, rejected that analogy and as well other analogies urged on the basis of
the membership selection process in the Congress.
The appeal to history is not sound. While the argument has been more
fully developed elsewhere,42 some observations are appropriate here. There can
be little doubt that those gifted individuals who drafted the United States
Constitution, and most of those who voted for its ratification in the various
states, were committed to the democratic ideal of equality and even, perhaps more
doubtfully, the concept of majority rule. Both ideas shine through the Declaration of Independence and the debates leading to the acceptance of the Constitution as transmitted to the states for ratification. And of course the writings
of such men as Thomas Jefferson, and, in more restrained vein, the contributions to The FederalistPapers, demonstrate similar concern for equal treatment
in a democratic, essentially majoritarian context. Thus, it is not surprising
that the so-called Virginia Plan, out of which emerged the basic pattern of
the Constitution during the Convention in 1787, originally provided for representation in accordance with population in both houses of Congress.4" But
the drafters of the Constitution were also practical men who recognized that
insistence on that principle would make impossible the ratification by a suffi39 See McKay, supra note 8, at 689.
40 Precise mathematical equality can ordinarily not be achieved except at the price of
severe gerrymandering that might make representation districts vulnerable to other criticism
or even constitutional attack. If the principles of compactness and contiguity are preserved
as normal objectives, some variation in the size of districts is inevitable.
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cient number of states of any constitution containing such a proposal. So equalitarian principles were in part set aside in the so-called Great Compromise
under which Congress still operates.
It must be noted, too, that other reasons besides sheer practical necessity
also looked in the same direction. Many of those early leaders, believers in
democracy though they were, at the same time were uneasy about placing too
great power in the hands of "the people." In a number of respects, the original
Constitution demonstrated confidence in control by the carefully chosen few
rather than by the undiscriminating many. Not only were senators to be chosen
without regard to population; more important, they were not even to be elected
directly by the voters, but by state legislatures. 4 As already noted, the choice
of President and Vice-President was not left to the people either, but to electors
to be chosen "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct. . ...,
And, in leaving to the states the fixing of the qualifications of voters for federal
office, the drafters of the Constitution were of course aware that they were
accepting such common state limitations on the right of franchise as disqualification of women, Negroes, and indeed the majority of white male citizens, often
leaving the franchise securely and exclusively in the care of the small number
of freeholders who alone were presumed to be worthy of trust in affairs of
government 6
Those attitudes and those restrictions have all been swept away with
changed views of the nature of democratic government and an enlarged sense
of responsibility of the general citizenry. The Constitution itself has been revised
to reflect these changing views. The fifteenth, seventeenth and nineteenth
amendments were specifically designed to enlarge the franchise; and we are
now told quite simply and directly that the command of the equal protection
clause in the fourteenth amendment must be similarly read.
In sum, however wise or unwise may have been the original decisions as
to the method of apportionment to be applied in the two houses of Congress,
the practice then given constitutional status at the federal level is irrelevant to
state legislatures which are undeniably bound by the command of the equal
protection clause. The equal protection clause must be read in light of contemporary experience, rather than with an over-the-shoulder glance at a
different practice by a different sovereign whose action is required by the Constitution, without the restriction of an equal protection clause.
Even apart from the inappropriateness of reliance on the federal analogy
for the reasons already stated, there is yet another reason for rejecting the
analogy. The constitutional decision which established the Senate without reference to population was made by sovereign states in an act of consensual union.
But counties, cities, towns, and other subdivisions of the states are not sovereign;
they neither have nor need the perquisites of sovereignty. The power of altering local political lines rests with the parent state and not with the dependent
units. Unlike the states, which are protected by the Constitution from boundary
44 Direct election of United States senators was not provided until the seventeenth
amendment in 1913.
45 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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changes,4 the lesser subdivisions within a state have no constitutional protection
against state legislative decisions to reduce, enlarge, alter, or abolish them."'
The argument is sometimes made that minority interests need and deserve
special representation as a protection against the tyranny of the majority. And
it is true that the Constitution recognizes the need to protect various groups
against majority pressures that might otherwise make intolerable the situation
of racial, religious, or politically unpopular minority groups. To endorse the
desirability, and indeed necessity, of such special provisions, however, is not
at all the same as to demand that some minority groups should be given the
reins of political power whereby they could act as though they were in fact the
majority. The proposition is untenable for at least two reasons. In the first
place, any American majority is itself composed of various component minority
groups that overlap and intersect, whether the perspective is race, religion,
ethnic origin, economic interest, urban, rural, or other special interest group.
There is no practical or defensible way of determining which minority interest
is to be preferred over which majority interest and indeed over other minorities.
In the second place, if it be suggested that a particular minority interest deserves
protection today against some majority assumed to be antagonistic to that
minority, there is no assurance of permanent security. That which the legislature can give it can also withdraw.
Support for favoritism toward minority interests is said to stem from an
absolute right of the legislature to order the affairs of the state, including the
composition of the state legislature, in ways that are rational. Reasons have
been suggested above for believing that such a relaxed view of rationality is
not enough to satisfy the imperatives of equal protection. Indeed, it may
even be doubted that it would be a rational government that would permit
minority interests, whether rural, religious, ethnic, or economic in character, to
fix the legislative policy of the state. To justify departure from the equalpopulation principle on such a basis is to permit minority government in defiance of majority wishes and interests. That is not the way of democracy.
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